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This brief summary of “schema” aims to help novices better appreciate what a schema is, how
it is used, and why it is important for theories of truth. The summary should not be interpreted
as replacing original work on “schema;” rather, it is meant to serve as a supplement for students
who are unfamiliar with schema in philosophy or mathematics. For a more detailed account,
I encourage interested readers to read Corcoran (2006) and Corcoran and Hamid (2016).
What is a schema?
To explain what a schema is let’s begin with two toy examples. First, a non-philosophical
example. Suppose that you’re baking star-shaped cookies. Sure, you could shape them your-
self, but using a star-shaped cookie cutter would provide you with a more efficient means of
creating and baking the cookies. The star-shaped cookie cutter serves as a template for the
cookie. Just as the cookie cutter is a template for the star-shaped cookie, so too is a schema a
template for a philosophic concept.
Second, a philosophical example. In an argument where a disjunct is eliminated from
a disjunction, the other disjunct follows. If we’re presented with “either A or B” and “A”
is false, then “B” necessarily follows. Let’s replace the variables, A and B, with common
expressions. Either zebras are reptiles or elephants are mammals. Zebras are not reptiles.
Therefore, elephants are mammals. The symbolised form acts as a schema for the specific
content.
A schema is a complex system composed of a linguistic template and a rule. The tem-
plate is a syntactic string composed of significant words, symbols, and placeholders. The rule
shows us how to employ the template to specify a potentially infinite multitude of phrases,
sentences, or arguments, specifies how placeholders are to be replaced to produce instances
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of the schema, and tells us how the significant symbols are to be understood and whether
instances of the schema belong to natural or formal languages.
On this rendering, we may think of the schema as an ordered triple. An ordered triple is a
set of three elements written in a certain or strict order. Schemas as an ordered triple consists
of the template, rule, and underlying language that determine the set of its instances.
How is a schema used in theories of truth?
To see how a schema is used in theories of truth I begin with Tarski’s schema T.1 Schema
T, “… is a true sentence if and only if …”, is composed of eight words and two placeholders
represented by ellipses (…). The rule requires that the second ellipsis to be replaced by a
declarative sentence of English, which is a translation of the object-language sentence into
what Tarski calls the meta-language, and the first ellipsis by a name of that sentence in what
he calls the object-language. Tarski (1933/1983: 155-6) identifies the T-schema with the
template, and in his famous article on truth (1944: 344) he explicitly identifies the expression
as a ‘schema’ which is ‘not a sentence, but only a schema of a sentence’. A sentence on
Tarski’s view is a meaningful sentence that says something in virtue of which it has a truth-
value (Tarski 1933/1983: 178). So, Tarski uses the word ‘sentence’ in the way we use the
word ‘proposition’. His original template was:
X is a true sentence if and only if p
The rule requires that the two placeholders, p and X, be filled in with a sentence of English
and by a name of that sentence, respectively (1933/1983: 155). Tarski’s favourite instance of
schema T is:
‘snow is white’ is a true sentence if and only if snow is white.
‘Snow is white’ is the name of the sentence snow is white. His (1944) article enlists a slightly
different string but does so without any new theoretical issues arising. Tarski’s (1969) article,
however, uses a template-text where the letter p is filled in as a place holder on both the left
and right side of the schema.
1Be forewarned: this brief summary is about schemas in theories of truth, so this brief introductory remark
is not meant to give a comprehensive overview of any of the truth-theories mentioned. If this submission was
supposed to be a comprehensive account of Tarski’s semantic conception of truth, then more space should have
been allocated to, e.g., Tarski’s distinction between the meta-language and object-language and how true sentences
should be relativised to a language. To omit the details of Tarski’s theory is not a bug but a feature of this short
summary.
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“p” is a true sentence if and only if p
In this text, the “p” is not being used as a quote name for p. Surprisingly, Tarski’s formulation
of the rule states that “‘p” is to be replaced on both sides,’ which does use “p” as a quote name
for p (Tarski 1969: 105).
Some have followed Tarski’s lead by identifying the schema with the template (e.g., Gold-
farb 2003 & Linsky 1952). Alonzo Church (1956: 149), however, avoids the identification of
the two. Notably, there is no substantive difference here to be noted; it’s merely a termino-
logical distinction.
Why is a schema important for different theories of truth?
Horwich’s minimalism identifies the schema with the set of instances and replaces true sen-
tences with propositions. Propositions, in Horwich’s sense, are identified with the truth-
conditions or the sense of a sentence. So, ‹p› is true if and only if p or ‹grass is green› is
true if and only if grass is green. Since different characters stand in for different blanks and
since even one notational change produces a different syntactic string in the strict sense, one
and the same set of instances may be determined by different scheme-template/side-condition
pairings for given a fixed language. This may have led Horwich to write as though the schema
is to be identified with the set of instances.
Quine’s disquotationalism does not identify the schema with its set of instances in the
way that Horwich does; instead, his claim is that when we say “‘snow is white” is true’ we
are only saying indirectly what we can say directly, that snow is white. There’s no more to the
truth of “snow is white” than is given by the T-sentence: ‘snow is white’ is true iff snow is
white. Accordingly, the biconditional is a partial definition of ‘true’. Take all of the sentences
of a language and then a list of all corresponding T-sentences to constitute a complete account
of ‘true’ for that language.
Field’s pure disquotationalism has two important features: (a) one can understand “Ut-
terance u is true” only to the extent that one can understand utterance u and (b) the claim that
utterance u is true is cognitively equivalent to u as that person understands u (Field 1994:
265-66). (b) means that, “To call ‘Snow is white’ disquotationally true is simply to call snow
white; hence it is not to attribute it a property that it wouldn’t have had if I and other English
speakers had used words differently” (1994: 266). According to Field, disquotational truth
need not depend upon how an utterance is used.2
2I am grateful for the comments I received from Bjørn Jespersen, Diego Marconi, and Décio Krause who
reviewed this Academia.edu Letters submission. I also appreciate the constructive feedback I received from Bob
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